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Party Organization and Satisfaction with Democracy:  
Inside the Blackbox of Linkage 
 
Paul Webb (University of Sussex, UK, Susan E. Scarrow (University of Houston, USA) & 





This article investigates the way in which party organizational resources and processes may affect 
perceptions of democracy, looking at the impact of parties’ top-down communication mechanisms 
and bottom-up internal processes. Our examination breaks new ground by pairing party 
organizational data from the Political Party Database (PPDB) with individual-level data from the 
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), and shows clear evidence of the link between 
parties’ organizational resource capacity and their ability to inspire satisfaction with democracy 
(the 'top-down' path from party organization to democratic evaluations). However, it does not 
appear that the degree of intra-party democracy practised (the 'bottom-up' path) has a similar 
impact. Overall, these results provide substantial evidence for the importance of party organization 




Party Organization and Satisfaction with Democracy: Introduction 
 
Political parties (in aggregate) are often given some or even much of the blame for today’s 
democratic malaise.  Some researchers portray the policies and behavior of “established” parties 
as the source of their own unpopularity, either because their policy collusion deprives voters of 
electoral choices (cf. Ignazi 2017;  Katz and Mair 1995), or because changes in their financing and 
internal organization make parties much less reliant on support from party members and other 
partisans (Scarrow, Webb & Poguntke 2017).  These and other changes in party priorities are said 
to result in “linkage failure”, with rising distrust of parties and declining satisfaction with 
democracy seen as evidence that parties are getting worse at providing the linkage that once was 
fundamental to their democratic contribution (Lawson and Merkl 2014).   While such diagnoses 
are plausible, for the most part they remain at a fairly general level:  specific parties and their 
activities are largely absent from both theoretical and empirical research on satisfaction with 
democracy. Even those who have questioned the “linkage failure” narrative have most often done 
so in terms of country-level factors rather than by disaggregating the impact of various party 
practices (cf. Dalton, Farrell & McAllister 2011); this is true even though contemporary parties 
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are evidently experimenting with new organizational styles to try to capture public support, 
including introducing various forms of of multispeed membership using social media channels to 
tie individuals to their parties (Gauja 2015; Scarrow 2015). As a result, while party researchers 
have paid much attention to parties’ putative linkage roles, we actually know very little about how 
parties as organizational actors help to shape citizens’ attitudes towards the democracies in which 
they compete. Put differently, few studies have looked inside the black box of linkage to 
investigate specific mechanisms whereby party organizations do a better or worse job of generating 
positive connections with their potential voters. And without understanding the mechanisms of 
linkage, it is hard to devise effect prescriptions for strengthening such bonds.  
 
This article contributes to filling this gap by investigating the way in which party organizational 
resources and processes may affect perceptions of democracy, looking in particular at the impact 
of parties’ top-down  communication mechanisms. The central objective is not so much to explain 
citizens’ level of satisfaction with democracy, but rather to demonstrate that party organization is 
one of the factors that drives such attitudes. To do this, we pair party organizational data from the 
Political Party Database (PPDB) with individual-level data from the Comparative Study of 
Electoral Systems (CSES), investigating the direct and indirect effects of party resources on 
supporters of 62 parties across 11 parliamentary democracies. Our results provide clear evidence 
of the link between parties’ organizational resource capacity and their ability to influence voters’ 
attitudes towards democracy. However, they do not provide evidence that popular attitudes 
towards wider democratic systems are affected by parties’ internal systems of democracy. Even 
so, these results provide substantial evidence for the importance of party organization and agency 
in fostering the popular legitimacy of democratic political systems. 
 
Sources of Democratic Satisfaction 
The stability of liberal democracy depends in part on its popular legitimacy, which explains high 
academic interest in citizens’ satisfaction with democracy (SWD). The extensive literature on the 
subject has uncovered an almost bewildering variety of explanations for levels of SWD. 
Institutional variables at the level of the political system feature prominently, such the contrast 
between consensus and majoritarian democracies, with the former widely seen as better for SWD 
than the latter; relatedly, the type of electoral system seems to matter, with proportional 
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representation apparently most conducive to SWD (Anderson & Guillory 1997; Aarts & 
Thomassen 2008; Bernauer & Vatter 2011). Another system-level explanation holds that ‘the 
quality of governance’ or ‘procedural fairness’ might impact on SWD (Magalhaes 2017); 
perceptions of corruption in the political system also may impact on SWD (Stockemer & 
Sundstrom 2013; Pellegati & Memoli 2018). System-level performance matters in other ways as 
well. A major part of the SWD story is the economic performance of countries or individuals, with 
many studies confirming a positive relation between such performance  (or perceived 
performance) and SWD (Clarke et al 1993; Anderson and Guillory 1997; Waldron-Moore 1999; 
Farrell and McAllister 2006; Blais and Gélineau 2007; Henderson 2008; Kim 2009; Wagner et al. 
2009; Ezrow and Xezonakis 2011; Bernauer & Vatter 2012; Schäfer 2013).  More specifically, it 
is claimed that certain governmental outputs such as the degree of social protection offered to 
citizens by a regime can covary significantly with SWD (Luhiste 2014). 
  
Factors endogenous to party and electoral politics also feature prominently in the literature. One 
frequently investigated (and confirmed) explanation is that election ‘winners’ (however they might 
be defined) are more likely to be satisfied with democratic performance than election ‘losers’ 
(Anderson & Guillory 1997; Singh, Karakoc & Blais 2012), while a variant on this suggests that 
the composition of government plays a part – that is, the greater the share of cabinet portfolios 
enjoyed by the party a voter supports, the higher that voter’s SWD is likely to be (Kestila-
Kekkonen & Soderlund 2017; Christmann & Torcal 2018). It is equally well-established that the 
ideological congruence of voters with winning parties fosters SWD (Henderson 2008; Ezrow & 
Xezonakis 2011). Most pertinently to our focus in this article, Shomer et al (2016) uncovered some 
evidence to suggest supporters of parties that use more inclusive candidate-selection methods tend 
to be more satisfied with democracy than supporters of parties which do not. 
 
As this brief review suggests, there is a large and growing literature investigating the factors which 
contribute to—or undermine—democratic satisfaction. Somewhat surprisingly, parties themselves 
have been largely absent from such analyses (with a few notable exceptions which we detail 
below). Thus, in this paper we seek to remedy that omission. We explore whether party 
organization plays a role in helping to legitimize democracy, directly or indirectly, looking 
specifically at differences in how parties’ organizational resources and internal decision-making 
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processes impact on citizen attitude towards democracy. We begin by reviewing what past studies 
reveal about how party organization facilitates democratic linkage. We then present our 
hypotheses, data and measurement strategies. Finally, we report our results.  
 
Linking Party Organization with Democratic Satisfaction 
Can parties’ organizational features affect citizens’ attachments to the political order? While there 
is relatively sparse empirical research on this issue, scholarship on parties and linkage provides 
important theoretical clues. It starts from the assumption that parties can (and should) use their 
organizations to strengthen democracy by providing “linkage”, which is generally defined in terms 
of two-way communication. Where party-based linkage works well, parties present voters with 
policy options, and citizens have opportunities to influence (though not necessarily to decide) these 
options, including parties’ candidate slates and their programmes (Sartori, 1976; Lawson 1980; 
Poguntke 2002; Römmele, Farrell & Ignazi, 2005; Dalton, Farrell & McAllister 2011; Allern & 
Bale 2012). Party-based linkage can be viewed as both a systemic property (in the sense that parties 
can combine to offer choice and accountability in a system) and a party-specific one. Thus, a party 
which does a bad job of providing linkage is likely to experience electoral difficulties, and may 
even disappear – party failure is linkage failure (Lawson & Merkl 2014).  If parties collectively do 
a bad job of linkage, this can lead to citizen disillusionment and de-stabilize the political system 
as a whole in the long run. 
 
The literature on linkage is generally not explicit or prescriptive about how parties need to organize 
to provide such linkage, but its association with two-way communication gives strong hints about 
what organizational characteristics could potentially affect a party’s linkage capacity.  On the one 
hand, if parties are to communicate key messages to supporters and potential supporters in a top-
down way, they need organizational resources that help them spread these messages. On the other 
hand, parties’ internal processes may matter for bottom-up communication: this type of linkage 
should be stronger where party procedures facilitate citizen voice and party responsiveness. 
    
Research on campaign effects provides mounting evidence about which resources may enhance 
parties’ electoral communications (cf Andre and Depauw 2016; Bhatti et al. 2019; Carty and 
Eagles 1999; Denver et al 2003; Fisher et al 2014; Gerber and Green 2000; Tavits 2012; Whiteley 
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and Seyd 1992). These studies, from an array of political systems, all provide evidence of the 
importance of party organizational resources in communicating with voters and mobilizing 
electoral support – with the key resources being money (and the professional staff that money can 
pay for), and the party members and other volunteers who engage in door-to-door canvassing and 
other types of grassroots campaigns. These resource types are not necessarily fungible and may 
have independent effects, particularly if there are restrictions on how and how much parties or 
candidates may spend on a campaign (Tavits 2012; Fisher et al 2014).  Moreover, even if members 
may help parties to communicate their messages, their help could come in different forms, 
depending in part on how parties seek to employ them. Thus, some parties may be more interested 
in enrolling members and other supporters because of their potential financial contributions (so-
called “cheque-book members”) than because of their potential help with canvassing. 
 
While these studies are focused on how parties’ organizational resources affect electoral behavior, 
they suggest that such resources could potentially have direct or indirect effects on citizens’ 
attitudes towards their political systems more generally.  Indeed, Rohrschneider and Whitefield 
(2012) found some such effects in one of the few studies to investigate how party efforts  may 
affect how citizens think about politics. They asked whether party organizational capacity affected 
congruence between party and voter positions, positing that parties with what they call mass party 
characteristics – “significant” memberships, strong central organizations, and links with civic 
organizations -- would be better able to communicate their messages, and would be more in tune 
with the preferences of potential voters. They find evidence that organizational strength is related 
to party-voter congruence in Western Europe; in contrast, they find no relationship (or even a 
negative relationship) in Central and Eastern Europe (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2012: 128-
131).  These findings suggest that under some circumstances parties’ organizational resources may 
matter for their communication, but they do not settle the question of whether some types of 
resources are more or less important to this process. 
 
Scholars and politicians have been more divided about the ways in which party structures and 
processes can best deliver bottom-up linkage, though many have firmly believed that parties’ 
organizational choices affect democratic quality. For instance, inspired by experiences of 1920s 
Europe, Sigmund Neumann praised what he called “parties of democratic integration” (1956), 
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which were similar to what Duverger and others called mass parties. For Neumann, this integration 
occurred because the parties provided some decision-making roles for members; they also 
provided programmatic representation of supporters.  Yet a long line of studies of mass parties 
raised doubts about these parties’ effectiveness in providing linkage, whether because of 
entrenched and isolated party elites (Michels 1911), the distorting priorities of party activists (May 
1973), or the short time horizons of election-oriented politicians (Panebianco 1988).  Indeed, these 
complaints were so prevalent in discussions about democratic failures that in the 1970s and 1980s 
New Politics parties entered the political scene with the intention of radically improving and 
democratizing political linkage through grassroots democracy (Poguntke 1987; Kitschelt 1988).  
More recently, both new and established parties have experimented with more plebiscitary forms 
of decision making that are claimed to make the parties more responsive to their supporters; these 
include giving members and/or registered supporters a say in picking party leaders, and—less 
frequently-- the on-line decision forums of parties such as the Italian Five Star Movement, or 
German parties like the Greens, The Alternative for Germany, and the Pirate Party. Despite the 
long-running debates, these ideas about how parties facilitate linkage tended to be asserted more 
than the foundational mechanisms were empirically tested, a few counter-examples excepted (cf. 
Poguntke 2000; Allern 2010, Allern & Bale 2012). Recent studies of the impact of 
member/supporter ballots for leadership selection have suggested that their use has at least a short-
term and positive effect on public attitudes towards the party that uses them (Shomer et al 2018), 
but that more inclusive party decision processes for candidate or leadership selection do not 
necessarily produce longer-term attitudinal effects, and may actually have dampening effects in 
areas such as levels of partisan campaign engagement (Kernell 2015) or voter-party congruence 
(Spies & Kaiser 2014). Thus, while party theory provides strong reasons to think that member-
based party decision-making might strengthen bottom-up linkage, and therefore might lead to more 
democratic satisfaction, the empirical evidence provides little basis to think that this is the case.  
 
In short, previous research gives us some hints about how party efforts and party communication 
opportunities may affect the way that citizens think about their political systems, but for the most 
part we lack studies focused directly on these relationships. In this study we therefore seek more 
evidence for the mechanisms whereby party organizational capacity and processes can serve to 
increase “linkage” that is reflected in levels of satisfaction with the performance of democratic 
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systems. By looking more closely at how party linkage mechanisms may work, we hope to gain 
insights into the democratic implications of parties’ organizational choices, the consequences of 
which may go beyond winning or losing votes. We set out our specific hypotheses in the following 
section.  
 
The paths from party organisation to democratic satisfaction: Hypotheses 
Our first hypothesis is the most basic one: it simply posits a direct relation between party 
organizational resources and individual-level satisfaction with democracy.  Here and elsewhere 
our hypotheses focus on relations between specific parties and the attitudes of their supporters 
because we expect supporters to be most aware of, and most impacted by, the activities of “their” 
parties.  Other citizens may also be affected, but if a relationship exists, it should be most strongly 
evident between a party and its supporters. We expect that the stronger a party’s resources, the 
more likely it will be able to ‘reach’ its supporters both during election campaigns and between 
them.  ‘Reach’ might  be direct, which is to say through personal, postal or electronic 
communication, or indirect - that is, through a party’s capacity to generate a strong presence via 
the national and local media. In brief, the stronger a party’s resources, the more likely it is to be 
able to communicate in one way or another with voters, and thereby mobilize enthusiasm and 
support, which should in turn generate positive feelings about the democratic process among the 
party’s supporters. Thus: 
 
H1: The greater a party’s organizational resources, the more likely that its voters will be satisfied 
with democratic performance in their country. 
 
Based on past studies of party communication during campaigns, we conceptualize these resources 
as having two main components: funding (which can be used to hire staff and to pay for 
professional publicity of various sorts), and members (who may contribute labour and/or funds to 
promote party communication efforts).  While we have no a priori hypotheses about which of 
these aspects of organizational strength should be most important for parties’ efforts to connect 
with citizens, disaggregating these different aspects of party organizational strength will provide 
better clues about the mechanisms underlying any relationships that we do discover.  Assuming 
that this hypothesis is confirmed for either or both measures of party resources, we must then seek 
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to deconstruct the process. If party organizational resources are important to generating electoral 
support, they should implicitly also foster feelings of general partisan attachment among at least a 
subset of each party’s voters. This is significant because previous research suggests that partisan 
affinity is a positive predictor of SWD. This generates the following two hypotheses: 
 
H2: The greater a party’s organizational resources, the stronger its voters’ sense of partisan 
affinity1 is likely to be. 
 
H3: Those with higher levels of partisan affinity will express higher levels of satisfaction with 
democratic performance in their country. 
 
 
Finally, it is also quite possible that organizational resources indirectly affect supporters’ political 
attitudes if these resources increase the party’s chances of electoral success: we know from 
previous research that those who support ‘winning’ parties are more likely to express satisfaction 
with democracy in their country. Therefore: 
 
H4: The greater a party’s organizational resources, the more likely its supporters will be on the 
side of a winning party in any given election. 
 
H5: The supporters of parties that ‘win’ elections are more likely to express satisfaction with 
democratic performance in their country than those who do not.  
 
Moreover, it is also possible that there is a causal relationship between different types of party 
organizational resource: as we explain below, we draw on two such indicators in this paper, party 
members and party income, and it seems plausible that the latter might well be significantly driven 
by former. For many parties, it remains the case that members are a non-trivial source of party 
income (Scarrow 1996; van Biezen & Kopecky 2017: 87-89). This gives rise to a further 
hypothesis that we can test: 
                                                





H6: The number of members a party has will be a positive predictor of its national income. 
 
These hypotheses describe the paths by which party organizational resources might impact 
positively on SWD; as such, they emphasize top-down linkage. Clearly, party organizational 
resources per se do not only directly impact on SWD; it is just as likely that resources increase 
parties’ ability to communicate their messages and mobilize support, thereby impacting on voters’ 
partisan attachments and the ability to win elections. Through these paths they send a general 
message, implicitly or explicitly, that they care what voters think. Such communication can 
reinforce attachments to specific parties as well as boosting positive ties to the democratic system 
as a whole. In addition to these top-down mechanisms that might flow from organizational 
resources, we have also seen that parts of the previous literature point to the potential impact of 
parties’ internal processes. That is to say, the more democratic rights grassroots members have 
over questions of intra-party decision-making, the more we might expect supporters of such parties 
to feel generally positive about the functioning of democracy in their country (Shomer et al 2016). 
In principle, we could imagine that the putative impact of intra-party democracy might flow 
directly from party processes to SWD, or indirectly through its positive impact on partisan affinity, 
thus giving rise to our last two hypotheses: 
 
H7: The more internally democratic a party is, the more likely its voters are to express satisfaction 




H8: The more internally democratic a party is, the stronger its voters’ sense of partisan affinity is 




To summarise, then, our hypotheses suggest a set of mechanisms whereby party organization can 
affect “linkage” in the sense of democratic legitimacy.  These relationships are depicted in Figure 
1. What then do the data reveal?2  
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Data and Measures 
Our strategy for assessing these hypotheses involves combining individual-level data from the 
CSES (Module 4) with organizational from the PPDB Round 1a.  The PPDB is a cross-national 
database on party organizational resources and structures, collected by a team of country experts 
(Poguntke, Scarrow, Webb et al 2016; Scarrow, Webb and Pogunkte 2017), which provides 
information on party resources (especially members and funding). Round 1a data come from the 
period 2011-15, which closely approximates the same period as the elections in CSES Module 4 
(2011-16). There are 11 countries which are common to these PPDB and CSES datasets, and on 
which we can therefore focus our analysis: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Germany, 
Ireland, Israel, Norway, Poland, Portugal and Britain. The merged dataset includes 14335 
individual respondents and 62 parties. For each country, the party organizational data from the 
PPDB were gathered in the same year, or a year or two prior, to the attitudinal data from the CSES, 
which reinforces the point that causality is likely to flow from party organization to satisfaction 
with democracy.3 The basic unit of analysis is the individual respondent of the CSES; for each 
respondent, the PPDB variable score (eg, membership per or income per voter) for whichever party 
they voted for in the most recent national legislative election (lower house) has been added.  In 
this way, we can gauge the party organizational resource strength of their preferred parties. 
 
Satisfaction with democracy – our key dependent variable – is a Likert scale response to the 
question ‘On the whole, are you very satisfied, quite satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all 
                                                
2 Note that it is possible to imagine some non-recursive relationships between these variables: for instance,  SWD 
might lead to partisan affinity (with individuals who are generally more satisfied with democracy being more likely 
to select a party on which to focus their identity and support). However, no variant of the basic model set out in Figure 
1 which included such terms produced any significant non-recursive effects. We therefore only present results of the 
more parsimonious recursive model here. 
3 In the minority of cases for which PPDB provides more than one year of data for the membership or money variables, 
we use the mean of the observations.  See Webb & Keith  2017 for more information on cross-party and cross-national 
differences in resource distribution.  
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satisfied with the way democracy works in your country?’; 1 represents ‘not at all satisfied’,  2 
represents ‘not very satisfied, 3 ‘quite satisfied’ and 4 ‘very satisfied’. Note that this indicator is 
best regarded as a measure of support for regime performance rather than for regime principles. 
Building on foundations first laid by David Easton, Pippa Norris (1999: Chapter 1) has pointed 
out that the concept of political support is multidimensional, distinguishing five aspects – support 
for the political community, regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions and 
political actors. As Linde and Ekman (2003: 391) point out, the variable used in the CSES dataset 
‘…is not an indicator of support for the principles of democracy, but…taps the level of support for 
the way the democratic regime works in practice.’ For instance, a respondent could be a 
convinced democrat, rejecting non-democratic alternatives, but nonetheless be dissatisfied 
with the way democracy works in his or her country at a given moment in time. Thus, a low 
score on this variable does not imply hostility to democratic principles per se, but simply that 
a respondent is disappointed with its current operation in a specific national context. But it 
should be noted that such evaluations relate to the political system as a whole rather than to 
the particular performance of the incumbent government of the day. 
 
In keeping with our conceptualization of party resources as having two main components, we use 
two measures of party organizational strength: membership size (standardized by the pool of 
eligible voters as the Membership/Electorate ratio), and national party income (measured in euros 
at constant prices and also standardized relative to the number of electors in a country). In Figure 
1 we refer to these as ‘members per voter’ and ‘income per voter’, respectively. In effect, these 
two indicators embrace two forms of labour that are potentially vital to a party’s campaigning and 
communication capacity, voluntary and paid. For many parties, the members provide the unpaid 
labour that is central to campaigning and mobilizational efforts, especially in local districts or 
regions, while money is what enables paid professional input (eg, by marketing, polling and 
advertising specialists), especially although not exclusively at national level. Money can pay for 
important things beyond the salaries of personnel, of course, such as advertising space, election 
broadcasts, travel and accommodation for campaign team members, and so on. So, we would argue 
that these two PPDB indicators – members per elector and party income per elector – capture much 




The degree of internal democracy attributable to each party is measured by the ‘Plebiscitary Intra-
Party Democracy’ (PIPD) index. This was first formulated by von dem Berge and Poguntke (2017) 
as a single measure designed to capture the extent to which political parties accorded a vote to 
grassroots members in a range of key decision-making procedures, including candidate-selection, 
leadership-election and policy-making. It is a standardized index ranging from 0-1, with higher 
scores indicating greater capacity for this plebiscitary mode of intra-party democracy. We have 
also added information to the merged dataset on whether or not respondents voted for winning or 
losing parties (the former being taken to mean any party that enjoyed governmental office during 
the period under analysis), this being relevant to H4 and H5. The dataset also contains variables 
taken from CSES on SWD, partisan affinity, and a number of controls.  
 
Partisan affinity is coded 1 for respondents declaring no attachment to any party, 2 for those who 
say they are ‘not very close’ to a party, 4 for those claiming to be ‘quite close’ to a party and 4 for 
those who are ‘very close’ to a particular party. The control variables in the model include factors 
known to be important for SWD, including prospective and retrospective evaluations of economic 
performance, with Gallagher’s Least-Squares index (which gauges the proportionality of electoral 
outcomes) deployed as a proxy for electoral system effects, along with several standard 
demographic factors. Our model also includes a measure of each party’s ideological position. Our 
assumption here is that more ideologically radical parties – whether far right or far left – will be 
more critical of the functioning of democracy in their respective countries. Using the Comparative 
Manifesto Project’s ‘RILE’ measure as an indicator of each party’s right-left ideological 
orientation, we have distinguished between those parties that are more than one standard deviation 
from the mean position of all parties in the dataset, and all other parties, the former being 
designated as ‘radical’ for the purposes of our analysis. Full details on the variables used in this 
paper are provided in the Appendix. 
 
Analysis and results: Does party organization influence citizens’ satisfaction with 
democracy?  
Hypotheses 1-6 set out above prescribe a series of paths from our two organizational resource 
measures to SWD, some of them direct, but some indirect, while hypotheses 7 and 8 account for 
the possible paths from intra-party democracy to SWD. Figure 1 shows the various paths set out 
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in these hypotheses, including the mediating variables (partisan affinity and supporting a winning 
party). A set of causal relationships such as that implied by these hypotheses requires a form of 
Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) that will tease out the various empirical relationships. Such 
an approach allows us, among other things, to treat some variables in the chain of causation as 
both dependent and independent variables. The most appropriate statistical technique is path 
analysis, which we conduct here, using robust standard errors clustered by country in order to 
account for country-level effects in each model. Of course, no statistical approach is beyond 
criticism, and path analysis is susceptible to a more general problem with quantitative models, 
which is that they can be underspecified; that is, the effect of mediating variables in causal paths 
can be under- or overestimated if key variables are omitted from models (Green et al 2010: 203). 
However, as is apparent from the above discussion (and Figure 1), we have sought to minimize 
such risks through the inclusion of a wide array of control variables that are known predictors of 
satisfaction with democracy. 
 
Figure 2 portrays the results of this path analysis. Standardized regression coefficients are shown 
adjacent to each path arrow, with asterisks indicating whether or not relationships are significant 
at p<.10 or better. Table 1, to which we shall return shortly, provides more detail, including direct, 
indirect and total effects for each predictor, and overall goodness of fit for the four endogenous 
variables in the models (party income, partisan affinity, Winner and SWD). Starting on the left 
side of the diagram, we find confirmation of H6, that the size of a party’s membership does indeed 
contribute positively to its income, albeit only significant at p<.10. This is not so surprising, since 
there are other sources of party income, of course – not least the state itself (van Biezen & Kopecky 
2017). Nevertheless, the membership still makes a difference, overall. We also see that party 
income is a positive predictor of SWD, this time significant at p<.001. However, a party’s 
membership size is not in itself a significant direct influence on SWD. In so far as H1 (‘The greater 
a party’s organizational resources, the more likely that its voters will be satisfied with democracy’) 
holds, then, this is mainly down to the impact of party income; party membership only seems to 
play an indirect role by contributing to the party’s financial resources. 
  




With respect to H2 (‘The greater a party’s organizational resources, the stronger its voters’ sense 
of partisan affinity is likely to be’),  we find once again that party income matters, while party 
membership does not. The former is a positive predictor of partisan affinity, significant at p<.10, 
while the latter is non-significant (and indeed, negatively signed). There is clear confirmation of 
H3 (‘Those with higher levels of partisan affinity will express higher levels of satisfaction with 
democracy’), with partisan affinity a positive predictor of SWD (p<.001). H4 (‘The greater a 
party’s organizational resources, the more likely its supporters will be on the side of a winning 
party in any given election’) is similarly confirmed, but only with respect to party income, the 
effect of which on ‘Winner’ is positive and significant (p<.05); once again, however, there is no 
significant effect from membership per voter to Winner.  H5 (‘The supporters of parties that ‘win’ 
elections are more likely to express satisfaction with democracy than those who do not’), is clearly 
confirmed, with ‘Winner’ being a positive predictor of SWD (p<.001).  
 
All this serves to show that a party’s organizational resources – especially its finances - do matter 
for a typical citizen’s degree of satisfaction with democracy in their country. Thus, the top-down 
channel of political linkage clearly weighs significantly in the balance. However, the same cannot 
be said for bottom-up linkage; intra-party democracy simply carries no weight for SWD. Neither 
of the relevant paths – either the direct one from PIPD to SWD, or the indirect one via partisan 
affinity – proves to be significant. This is a strikingly different finding from the previous research 
reported by Shomer and her colleagues (2016). By its nature, however, the PIPD Index is much 
broader in content than the candidate-selection indicator employed in their study of the effects of 
intra-party democracy on satisfaction with democracy; while Shomer et al focused solely on 
candidate-selection, PIPD also takes into account leadership selection and policy-making. Also, 
PIPD measures only a specific variant of intra-party democracy, namely plebiscitary decision-
making. These factors (and the difference between samples) most likely explain the rather different 
findings between that study and this one.   
 
In terms of the control variables entered into the equation, we see that economic evaluations 
(prospective expectations of future personal standards of living and retrospective assessments of 
recent national economic performance) have the expected positive significant effects on SWD 
(p<.001 in both cases), along with education (p>.05); graduates are a little more likely to express 
14 
 
satisfaction with democracy than non-graduates. We also find confirmation that people who 
support more radical parties, be they well to the left or to the right of the the ideological centre-
ground, are less likely to express satsifaction with democracy. However, neither the extent to 
which a country’s electoral system produces proportional representative outcomes in the national 
legislature, nor the age, gender or socio-economic status of a respondent have any significant 
impact. 
  
If we examine the information on indirect and total effects reported in Table 1, we discover 
additional evidence of the importance of party organization for SWD. Although the effects are 
only significant at p<.10, it can be seen that party income and membership both have positive 
indirect effects on SWD. They each achieve this via the path that goes through support for a 
winning party. This becomes clearest when we focus on the total effects results: in particular, it 
now becomes evident that the total effect of party membership on SWD is positive, producing a 
standardized coefficient of .05 (p=.013), while that for party income is .15 (p=.000). So, to 
summarize, the route from party organizational resources to satisfaction with democracy seems to 
go like this: the membership helps to provide funding, and party income is then significant in 
boosting SWD, both directly, and through its capacity to enhance partisan affinity and to contribute 
to electoral success (ie, being a ‘winner’).  By contrast, plebiscitary intra-party democracy does 
not appear to carry any significance for people’s attitudes towards the democratic performance of 
their country – which is at odds with the growing popularity of plebiscitary decision-making 
among parties in modern democracies, and at odds with arguments often made in favour of this 
shift. 
 
One question that arises from this is whether party income might simply be a proxy for the size of 
a party. Is it the case that those who vote for parties with large incomes are more satisfied with the 
democratic system in their country simply because they have chosen to support the biggest parties 
that tend to fare well under it? There may be an element of this behind our findings, but two things 
should be borne in mind. First, the effect of party income on SWD (and partisan affinity) remains 
significant even when we control for whether or not a party is a ‘winner’. Second, when we add a 
further control for the share of the vote gained by a party in national lower house elections, none 
of our results change in substance: again, party income retains its significant and positive effect on 
15 
 
partisan affinity and SWD. So, party organisational resources seem to play an independent role in 
fostering and sustaining support for democracy. 
 
Discussion 
Taken as a whole, our findings provide evidence that party organization matters for overall 
satisfaction with democracy, and that it has both direct and indirect effects on the ways that citizens 
perceive their systems, and in how they engage with politics. More specifically, these findings 
clearly show that well-resourced parties are not only best placed to sustain electoral support, but 
also to enhance the popular legitimacy of democratic systems. They also provide more tentative 
support for the continued value of the subscriber-democracy model of party organization – that is 
to say, of parties based on formal dues-paying membership (or at least, the modern ‘multispeed 
membership’ variant of this classic model [Scarrow 2015]). Such parties can still help to generate 
resources, and members still represent one channel of communication with voters, even if not 
necessarily the principal one. This model was traditionally associated with cleavage-based mass 
parties, but it has also endured into the era of more catch-all and professionally oriented parties, 
albeit with often declining membership numbers. In response to these changes, some party scholars 
and party elites have been eager to write off this model in favour of new alternatives, be these non-
partisan citizen juries, digital discussion boards, or social media-led movements. While some or 
all of these democratic innovations may have their advantages, our findings here point in the 
direction of a chain of causal relations whereby organizationally stronger parties are more effective 
in communicating with voters and sustaining their partisan affinity, and in promoting satisfaction 
with democratic processes in general. In this sense, they provide an original and important insight 
into the power of party organizations as something that must be viewed as integral to our 
understanding of how electoral democracies maintain the support and consent of their citizens. 
How parties organize is therefore not just a matter of internal concern for the parties themselves, 
nor is it just a contributor to parties’ short-term electoral success. Rather, parties’ organizational 
choices and capacities have the potential to play a much larger and longer-term role in promoting 
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Table 1: Direct, Indirect and Total Effects (n=14206, all standard errors clustered by 11 
countries) 
 







Income per voter 
Members per 
voter 




.11 .06 .062 .13 
Members per 
voter 
-.06 .05 .280 -.06 




.15 .07 .027 .45 
Members per 
voter 
.02 .02 .229 .06 
Satisfaction with Democracy 
Income per 
voter 
.12 .02 .000 .21 
Partisan affinity .06 .01 .000 .09 
Winner .18 .05 .000 .11 
Members per 
voter 
.00 .01 .875 .00 
Least Squares 
Index 
.01 .01 .485 .04 
Age .00 .00 .108 .02 
Graduate .05 .03 .048 .03 
Right-Left 
Radicalism 
-.06 .03 .023 -.04 
Sex .01 .01 .547 .01 
Household 
Income Quartile 








.19 .02 .000 .18 






















.05 .03 .065 .13 
Satisfaction with Democracy 
Income per 
voter 
.03 .02 .052 .06 
Members per 
voter 
.05 .03 .064 .08 













Income per voter 
Members per 
voter 




.11 .06 .062 .13 
Members per 
voter 
-.02 .04 .617 -.02 




.15 .07 .027 .45 
Members per 
voter 
.07 .03 .029 .20 
Satisfaction with Democracy 
Income per 
voter 
.15 .03 .000 .27 
Partisan affinity .06 .01 .000 .09 
Winner .18 .05 .000 .11 
Members per 
voter 
.05 .02 .013 .08 
Least Squares 
Index 
.01 .01 .485 .04 
Age .00 .00 .108 .02 
Graduate .05 .03 .048 .03 
Right-Left 
Radicalism 
-.06 .03 .023 -.04 
Sex .01 .01 .547 .01 
Household 
Income Quartile 








.19 .02 .000 .18 
PIPD .00 .00 .571 .01 
 
Goodness of fit statistics (R2) for endogenous variables in model 
 
Income per voter  .088 
28 
 
Partisan affinity .016 
Winner .226 
Satisfaction with democracy .143 
 
 
